Football Analysis: Καζάν-Παναθηναϊκός

Οι πάσες του Παναθηναϊκού σε ολόκληρο το ματς. Δημιούργησε 7 προϋποθέσεις για γκολ

Ο Γκοβού, όσο και αν έχει χάσει ταχύτητα είναι πιο ταχύς από τους στατικούς Γκαρθία και Καραγκούνη, ενώ η είσοδος του Γκαραντενίζ ήταν καταλυτική για την Καζάν, καθώς δημιούργησε πολλούς κινδύνους για την «πράσινη» άμυνα.

Παρόλα αυτά, καμία ομάδα δεν έκανε αυτό που έπρεπε για να κερδίσει. Η Ρουμπίν δημιούργησε περισσότερες ευκαιρίες, αλλά τα «τελειώματα» των παικτών της ήταν άσχημα. Ο Παναθηναϊκός δεν μπόρεσε να αξιοποιήσει τον Σισέ και να έχει συνδυασμούς ανάμεσα στους παίκτες που απάρτιζαν την επιθετική τριάδα.

Έλειψαν και οι εμπνεύσεις και η καλή συνεννόηση μεταξύ τους και παρά το γεγονός ότι η Ρουμπίν είχε πάρει μέτρα στο γήπεδο όσο τέλειωνε ο χρόνος, αφήνοντας κενά στον Παναθηναϊκό, οι φιλοξενούμενοι, σπατάλησαν τις λίγες ευκαιρίες που είχαν.

English Text

Panathinaikos and Rubin Kazan served up another underwhelming 0-0, in a game neither side deserved to take the three points from.

Rubin kept their basic shape of two banks of four, with Carlos Eduardo coming in to support Sergei Kornilenko upfront. This meant that there was no place for Gokdeniz Karadeniz, who had caused Panathinaikos’ defence such problems in the first game. The dangerman Alan Kasaev started on the left wing.

Nikos Nioplias changed his system completely from the side that had contested the first three games of the Champions League. He moved Kostas Katsouranis into a more defensive role as a third centre-back alongside Cedric Kante and Jean-Alain Boumsong. This meant that the two full-backs became more attack-minded wing-backs, and rather than playing with orthodox wingers, Giorgos Karagounis and Luis Garcia drifted between wide areas and central positions depending upon the situation.

It was interesting to see Panathinaikos take the field with a back three, a system that has almost completely died out amongst top sides in European competition. The basic reason for this was the decline in the use of two-striker formations, something the back three coped with very well. There, you could have two markers in conjunction with a spare man at the back. But with 4-5-1 systems increasingly being used throughout Europe, the three-man defence found it much more difficult to adapt. In that situation, you have three defenders against one striker – fine defensively, but liable to leave you with a man less somewhere else on the pitch.

Therefore, three-man defences are best used only in certain circumstances, and teams that can shift between three- and four-man defences are particularly useful here. Otto Rehhagel is one manager who was keen to use three centre-backs when faced with two strikers, and two centre-backs when faced with one striker. That general strategy has become reasonably popular with managers who are comfortable with playing the two systems – Chile manager Marcelo Bielsa uses a 3-3-1-3 or a 4-2-1-3 on similar lines.

Therefore, the test of whether Panathinaikos’ three-man defence would work was seeing how Rubin would play – whether Carlos Eduardo would play as a second striker, and therefore fall into the hands of the centre-backs, or whether he would play in a deeper midfield position, rendering one of the centre-backs redundant. Unfortunately for Panathinaikos, and for the game as a spectable, he played the deeper role.

This meant that Panathinaikos were over-stocked in defence, with three defenders dealing with just one player, Kornilenko. The three were able to pass the ball around the back with ease, but when it came to getting the ball further up the pitch, they met problems, since there was simply one too many players defending, and one too few attacking.

The system Panathinaikos used was a fluid one, that looked like 5-4-1 when defending, 3-4-3 when attacking, and 3-6-1 when in the ‘transition’ stage. The key to this shift was the roles of the wing-backs, Nikos Spiropoulos and Loukas Vyntra. They got back level with the centre-backs when defending, but when they were on the attack, they would charge up the pitch and give Karagounis and Luis Garcia license to move forward and try and support Cisse.

What went wrong, then? In addition to the fact Panathinaikos had one too many centre-backs, they also had problems getting support to Cisse. The reason for this lies in the fact Karagounis and Garcia are not pacey or mobile enough to play the role they were asked of here. Rubin’s deep defensive line meant that the play was stretched, and there was generally too big a gap between Cisse and the rest of the side. Panathinaikos were essentially a ‘broken team’, lacking a link between the main striker and the rest fo the side.

Furthermore, when Karagounis and Luis Garcia did end up in the centre of the pitch, they opened up space on the flanks for the two Rubin full-backs to get forward and create 2 v 1 situations with the Rubin wingers against the Panathinaikos wing-backs. This meant that the two ‘outside’ centre-backs for Panathinaikos were dragged over to the flanks and often looked uncomfortable – Boumsong, in particular, is not suited to moving into wide positions, and looked nervous when he had to deal with Kasaev.

Considering Panathinaikos had more than enough defenders, they probably didn’t need to use both Gilberto Silva and Simao in front of the defence either. With Rubin’s two central midfielders playing quite deep, the two midfields essentially played in front of each other rather than looking to break forward towards goal, and it was no surprise there were few goalscoring chances.

Panathinaikos dealt well with Kasaev, who had been the most exciting player in the first match. They got men around him when the winger got the ball, and Panathinaikos were actually helped by the injury to Boumsong – it meant Marinos came on at right-wing-back and Loukas Vyntra moved in at right-centre-back, and therefore they had two mobile players to deal with Kasaev.

The game opened up late on when both sides injected some pace into the equation. Nioplias turned to Sidney Govou – not as fast as he once was, but in comparison to Garcia and Karagounis, he offered a lot more speed. For Rubin, the introduction of Karadeniz was crucial and he became the game’s key player, winning free-kicks and putting in a couple of splendid crosses that should have been converted into goals.

Ultimately, neither side did enough to win the game. Rubin created chances but they seemed to fall to the wrong players, and the finishing was poor. Panathinaikos created fewer chances because of the lack of understanding between Cisse, Karagounis and Garcia. None of these players are renowned for their vision or unselfishness, and it was very rare to see a good passing move between two of them. Too often Garcia or Cisse would try something spectacular and it would fail – and the body language between the two suggested they didn’t particularly relish playing with one another.